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Abstract
This paper analyzes the general equilibrium effects of monetary policy choices on port-
folio shares of domestic and foreign currency denominated securities. Concentrating on the
small open economy case, it relates the optimal choice of portfolio shares to the domestic-
foreign interest rate differential. The ﬁrst contribution of the paper is to show that there are
indeed conditions under which a portfolio balance relationship holds in equilibrium, after
the effects of government tax and spending policies have been endogenized. This has two
important implications. First, monetary policy can be shown to not only affect the level of
inﬂation via a target path for the nominal anchor, but also the volatility (and also the level) of
inﬂation via balance sheet operations. Most strikingly, sterilized intervention affects interest
rates through its effect on inﬂation volatility. Second, this provides a theory of currency risk
premia and their endogenous determination by fundamentals and monetary policy, including
a determination of the conditions under which risk premia are or are not signiﬁcant.
We identify two factors that affect the effectiveness of sterilized intervention. The ﬁrst
is the prevalence of exogenous ﬁscal spending shocks, shocks that induce budget balancing
exchange rate movements instead of being ﬁnanced by endogenous tax responses. The sec-
ond is the central bank’s initial balance sheet position - sterilized intervention has the largest
effects if the government has only issued small amounts of domestic currency denominated
debt. This suggests that the conditions that give rise to this type of imperfect asset substi-
tutability are more likely to be observed in developing countries.
The authors thank Guillermo Calvo, Ken Judd, Carmen Reinhart, Ken Rogoff, Tom Sargent,
Martin Schneider and Stephen Turnovsky for helpful comments.1 INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the general equilibrium effects of monetary policy choices on
portfolio shares of domestic and foreign currency denominated securities. Concentrating on
thesmallopeneconomycase, itrelatestheoptimalchoiceofportfoliosharestothedomestic-
foreign interest rate differential. The ﬁrst contribution of the paper is to show that there are
indeed conditions under which a portfolio balance relationship holds in equilibrium, after
the effects of government tax and spending policies have been endogenized. This has two
important implications. First, monetary policy can be shown to not only affect the level of
inﬂation via a target path for the nominal anchor, but also the volatility (and also the level) of
inﬂation via balance sheet operations. Most strikingly, sterilized intervention affects interest
rates through its effect on inﬂation volatility. Second, this provides a theory of currency risk
premia and their endogenous determination by fundamentals and monetary policy, including
a determination of the conditions under which risk premia are or are not signiﬁcant.
We identify two factors that affect the effectiveness of sterilized intervention. The ﬁrst is
the prevalence of exogenous ﬁscal spending shocks, shocks that induce budget balancing
exchange rate movements instead of being ﬁnanced by endogenous tax responses. The
second is the central bank’s initial balance sheet position - sterilized intervention has the
largest effects if the government has only issued small amounts of domestic currency
denominated debt. This suggests that the conditions that give rise to this type of imperfect
asset substituta b i l i t ya r em o r el i k e l yt ob eo b s e r v e di nd e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r i e s .
The paper is motivated by a curious tension between economic theory and practice on the
question of sterilized intervention. Most notably in developing countries, central bankers
routinely intervene in foreign exchange markets with offsetting operations in domestic
currency debt, with the intention of affecting interest rates and real activity without changing
the money supply and therefore inﬂation. Their thinking might be taken to reﬂect older,
partial equilibrium versions of portfolio balance theory such as Branson and Henderson
2(1985). But the economics profession, both theorists and empiricists, has been challenging
the validity of such models for some time. We begin by summarizing this critique, and then
develop our model.
The standard reference of modern open economy macroeconomics, Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996), dismisses portfolio balance theory as partial equilibrium reasoning because it omits
the government budget constraint. This point is made most comprehensively in an important
paper by Backus and Kehoe (1989).
1 They show that under complete asset markets, or
under incomplete asset markets and a set of spanning conditions, changes in the currency
compositionofgovernmentdebtrequireno offsettingchangesinmonetary and ﬁscalpolicies
to both meet the government budget constraint and to leave private budget constraints
unaffected. Consequently this ’strong form’ of intervention is irrelevant for equilibrium
allocations and prices. This result does not depend on Ricardian equivalence, monetary
neutrality, or the law of one price, and can be shown using only an arbitrage condition.
The authors then go on to argue that weaker forms of government intervention in asset
markets generally require offsetting changes in monetary and/or ﬁscal policies to meet the
government budget constraint. Because the impact of such ’weak form’ interventions can
as easily be attributed to these monetary and/or ﬁscal changes as to the intervention per se,
sterilized intervention cannot be considered a separate, third policy instrument.
When the question of the efﬁcacy of sterilized intervention is posed in this most general
form, the results of Backus and Kehoe (1989) are very powerful. However, as these authors
point out themselves, this leaves open the narrower but practically very important question
of precisely how ’weak form’ interventions affect the economy. The answer to this question
requires taking a stance on the precise form of other government policies. In this context, one
important consideration is that ﬁscal policy is generally not used as a short-term instrument
1 Other related references include: Sargent and Smith (1988) on the irrelevance of open
market operations in foreign currencies; Chamley and Ptolemarchakis (1984), Sargent and
Smith (1987), and Wallace (1981) on the irrelevance of domestic open market operations.
3to affect asset market equilibria. It is therefore plausible to rule out ﬁscal behavior that
can respond arbitrarily to asset market interventions, and instead to consider only tax and
spending rules whose form is independent of such interventions. We can then ask how
sterilized intervention affects equilibrium allocations and prices conditional on the precise
form of these rules. In other words, we ask whether sterilized intervention is effective as
a second independent instrument of monetary policy. This is in fact a nontrivial exercise,
becauseseveralpaperssuchasObstfeld(1982)andGrinolsandTurnovsky(1994)havegiven
a negative answer to that question. They show that, once a monetary policy rule such as a
money growth rule is speciﬁed, sterilized intervention has no further effects on asset market
equilibria. In their models domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes in general
equilibrium, so that a version of uncovered interest parity holds. In this paper we show
that these results depend on the speciﬁcf o r mo ft h eﬁscal policy rule used by these authors,
namely lump-sum redistribution of all government net revenue, and complete absence of
exogenous ﬁscal spending. While this is a convenient and frequently used assumption, it is
also very strong, and we contend that in many real world cases it is not very descriptive of
actual government behavior. When it is replaced by assuming at least some exogenous ﬁscal
spending, sterilized intervention can become an effective second instrument of monetary
policy. Our paper explores the nature of its effects in general equilibrium.
The model assumes stochastic processes for the nominal money supply, velocity, real
returns on internationally tradable assets, and government spending. All of these processes
generate nominal exchange rate volatility. Domestic currency denominated government debt
securities therefore generate a stochastic seigniorage ﬂow, and in partial equilibrium this
would give rise to currency risk for private asset holders. But in general equilibrium, ﬁscal
policy, or in other words the use of this seigniorage by the government, is critical. In the
case of full lump-sum redistribution to households, we will conﬁrm the well-known result
that currency risk is absent in general equilibrium and that uncovered interest parity must
hold. But that assumption is not available for exogenous ﬁscal spending. As long as such
4spending is not a perfect substitute for private spending, we can then show that in this case
domestic currency denominated government bonds are risky even in general equilibrium.
They are imperfect substitutes for foreign currency denominated bonds and their portfolio
share is determined by a portfolio balance equation.
The focus of this paper on emerging markets is also justiﬁed on empirical grounds. As
mentioned above, economists have questioned the effectiveness of sterilized intervention
not only theoretically but also empirically. Edison (1993) is a good summary of the latter,
but her evidence is limited to developed countries. The evidence for emerging markets
summarized by Montiel (1993) is thinner but it does suggest some effectiveness of sterilized
intervention. A key precondition for this is imperfect substitutability between domestic
and foreign currency denominated bonds. An important paper by Bansal and Dahlquist
(2000) presents valuable and more recent evidence on this question. These authors ﬁnd high
currency risk premia in emerging markets, and show that country-speciﬁc risk factors are
much more important than systematic portfolio risk factors in explaining the cross-country
variation is risk premia. Our model explores one important country-speciﬁcr i s kf a c t o r ,ﬁscal
spending volatility. Gavin and Perotti (1997) document that Latin American countries do
indeed exhibit much more ﬁscal volatility than OECD countries.
Our paper is related to a large theoretical literature trying to explain nominal interest
rate risk premia. These are generally decomposed into default risk premia and currency
risk premia. While there is a well-established and growing literature on interest rate default
risk premia
2, currency risk is a less straightforward notion. Engel (1992) and Stulz (1984)
show that in ﬂexible price monetary models monetary volatility per se will not give rise to
a risk premium. Engel (1999), using the frameworks of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998, 2000)
and Devereux and Engel (1998), shows that sticky prices are required to generate a risk
premium. However, the terms that he identiﬁes as being able to generate risk premia are
2 The early contributions include Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Aizenman (1989). More
recent contributions include Kehoe and Perri (2001) and Kletzer and Wright (2000).
5generally empirically small in industrialized countries. In developing countries this may be
different, but the added difﬁculty there is to distinguish currency risk premia or discounts
from sometimes large default risk premia.
Our theory suggests an alternative explanation that depends on the fundamentals of ﬁscal
policy, and that has very different implications for monetary policy, speciﬁcally the ability of
central bank sterilized intervention to affect interest rates and allocations. In a ﬂexible price
setting, it generates a risk discount due to a Jensen’s inequality term.
3 We show that this term
can in fact be very small if the government has issued a large amount of nominal debt, and
if exogenous ﬁscal spending volatility is small, as may be the case in many industrialized
countries. This would be consistent with the empirical evidence mentioned by Engel (1999).
But in the opposite scenario this discount can be of the order of several hundred basis points,
and it can give the government signiﬁcant scope for balance sheet operations. The fact that
in many developing countries one often observes an overall risk premium is likely to be due
to the interaction of discounts of the kind we emphasize with borrowing risk premia and with
Peso-problem type premia of the kind emphasized by Obstfeld (1987).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
presents an illustrative example of the model’s results and policy implications using Mexican
data. Section 4 concludes. Mathematical details and details of the data used are presented in
a number of appendices.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a small open economy composed of a continuum of identical inﬁnitely
lived households and a government. Households’ consumption ct is ﬁnanced from a
constant endowment stream y
4 and from the returns on three types of ﬁnancial assets,
3 It also incorporates a borrowing risk premium. While this could be used for some interesting
policy experiments, in this paper it will only be used to complete the model and to rule out
interest rate indeterminacy at extremely high levels of government borrowing.
4 The endowment stream is not strictly necessary for the theoretical model. But it is critical
6domestic currency denominated money Mt with a zero nominal return, domestic currency
denominated bonds Qt with a nominal return i
q
tdt, and internationally tradable assets bt with
a real return drb
t. The nominal exchange rate Et ﬂoats. Aggregate exchange rate risk cannot
be hedged through ﬁnancial instruments.
5 We will see that this may, but need not, imply that
ﬁnancial markets are incomplete. All goods are tradable and the international price level is
normalized to one. Assuming purchasing power parity, domestic goods prices Pt therefore
satisfy Pt = Et. Nominal variables are denoted by upper case letters and real variables in
terms of tradable goods by lower case letters.
We use a continuous time stochastic monetary portfolio choice model to derive
households’ optimal consumption and portfolio decisions.
6 In order to determine the
equilibrium portfolio share of domestic currency denominated assets in a small open
economy, we follow Grinols and Turnovsky (1994) in assuming that these bonds are held
exclusively by domestic residents. This is not a restrictive assumption for many emerging
markets, where the vast majority of claims by foreigners tends to be denominated in dollars.
Figure 1 illustrates this for the case of Mexico, the country that we will use later for a
calibration of the model’s shock processes.
2.1 Shock Processes
We ﬁx a probability space (Ω,z,P). A stochastic process is a measurable function Ω
× [0,∞):7→ <. The value of a process X at time t is the random variable written as




for the computed example in Section 3.
5 This requires that the risk of the domestic currency is too idiosyncratic to be internationally
diversiﬁable, or that that market is too small relative to transactions costs. Both are plausible
for emerging markets. Of course individual households can hedge domestically if there is
heterogeneity among them. But what matters is that households as a whole cannot hedge
their aggregate domestic currency exposure vis-a-vis their own government.
6 Useful surveys of the technical aspects of stochastic optimal control are contained in Chow
(1979), Fleming and Rishel (1975), Malliaris and Brock (1982), Karatzas and Shreve (1991), and
Dufﬁe (1996). The seminal papers using this technique to analyze macroeconomic portfolio
selection are Merton (1969, 1971) and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985). Other contributions
include Dumas and Uppal (2000), Grinols and Turnovsky (1994), and Stulz (1983, 1984, 1987, 1988).
7of shocks BM
t to the growth rate of the nominal money supply, shocks Bα
t to the growth
rate of consumption velocity αt = ct
(Mt/Et), and shocks Br
t to the real return on tradable
assets drb
t.W e a l s o d e ﬁne a one-dimensional Brownian motion Wt that represents shocks
to the growth rate of government spending dgt. We employ different notation for this shock
because, compared to Bt, it assumes a different transmission channel between money and
the exchange rate. This difference is critical for our results.
Speciﬁcally, all shocks affect the return properties of domestic currency denominated
assets through the exchange rate, and this has repercussions for the government budget
constraint. The difference between Bt-shocks and Wt-shocks is the nature of the ﬁscal
response. We assume that with respect to Bt-shocks the ﬁscal policy response is
endogenous. This means that the government redistributes the net ﬁscal balance resulting
from ﬁnancial transactions back to households via lump-sum transfers. But Wt-shocks are
by assumption exogenous shocks to ﬁscal policy, and here we assume that the exchange
rate adjusts to balance the government’s budget. This in turn implies that monetary
policy is endogenous, speciﬁcally that money is allowed to accommodate the exchange rate
movements necessitated by ﬁscal balance.
The nominal money supply follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift process µt




M] with respect to Bt-shocks, an endogenous diffusion σ
g




= µtdt + σMdBt + σ
g
M,tdWt . (1)
Here we index endogenous drift and diffusion terms by time if they represent possibly time-
varying monetary policy choices, or if they are functions of such choices. Finally, we will
at a later stage allow for unanticipated, one-off and discontinuous shocks to the stock of
money ∆Mt. T h i sw i l lb er e q u i r e dt od i s c u s st h ee f f ects of unsterilized foreign exchange
interventions and of domestic open market operations. That discussion will be useful to
decompose the effects of sterilized foreign exchange interventions. For the latter, the main
8topic of this paper, money follows equation (1) without any discontinuities.
Theprocessforvelocityissimilar, exceptofcourseinthatvelocitydoesnotendogenously
respond to ﬁscal shocks:
dαt
αt
= νdt+ σαdBt . (2)
The real return on tradable assets follows a process
dr
b
t = rdt+ σrdBt . (3)
It is assumed that the exogenous components of the stochastic processes dlog(Mt), dlog(αt)
and drb
t are correlated, with a variance-covariance matrix Σ. Finally, government spending
follows a process for which shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with Bt-shocks:
dgt
at
= gdt + σ
g
gdWt . (4)
A critical feature of ﬁscal spending shocks is that they are assumed to introduce a real risk
for holders of government liabilities because of their implications for the government budget.
For this risk to matter in general equilibrium, it must be true that government consumption is
an imperfect substitute for private consumption. We choose the simplest and most tractable
assumption under which this is true, namely government spending does not enter household
utility at all.
The tribe zBW
t includes every event based on the history of the above four Brownian
motion processes up to time t. We complete the probability space by assigning probabilities
t os u b s e t so fe v e n t sw i t hz ero probability. We deﬁne zt to be the tribe generated by the union
of zBW
t and the null sets. This leads to the standard ﬁltration z = {zt : t ≥ 0}.
The nominal exchange rate process Et is endogenously determined as a function of the
four exogenous stochastic processes. It follows a geometric Brownian motion, with its drift
εt and diffusions σE and σ
g
E,t to be determined in equilibrium:
dEt
Et
= εtdt + σEdBt + σ
g
E,tdWt . (5)
We assume and later verify that the endogenous drift and diffusion terms are adapted
processes satisfying
R T












¢2 dt < ∞ almost surely for each T. The corresponding conditions
for all exogenous or policy determined drift and diffusion processes hold by assumption -
the exogenous terms are constants and policy choices µt are assumed to be bounded.
In the ensuing analysis we will use the following shorthand notation for diffusion terms,














































The representative household has time-separable logarithmic preferences
7 that depend on
his lifetime stochastic path of tradable goods consumption {ct}∞
t=0.I ti sc o n v e n i e n tt om o d e l






−βtln(ct − y)dt , 0 <β<1 , (6)
where β is the rate of time preference. We denote the real stocks of money and domestic
bondsbymt = Mt/Et andqt = Qt/Et, andtotalprivateﬁnancialwealthbyat = bt+qt+mt.






Finally, households are subject to a lump-sum tax dTt levied as a proportion of wealth and




= τtdt + σT,tdBt . (7)
The drift and diffusion terms will be determined in equilibrium from a balanced budget
requirement for the government. Note that taxes respond to Bt-shocks but not to Wt-shocks.
We assume that
R T
0 |τt|dt < ∞ almost surely for each T and
R T
0 (σT,t)
2 dt < ∞ almost
7 Logarithmic preferences are commonly assumed in the open economy asset pricing and
portfolio choice literature for their analytical tractability, see e.g. Stulz (1984, 1987) and Zapatero (1995).
10surely for each T, and will later verify that this is satisﬁed in equilibrium. The household





















t i st h er e a lr a t eo fr e t u r no na s s e ti.T h eﬁnal term Γt represents a risk-premium on







where I is an index, with I =1if (nm
t + n
q
t) >φand I =0otherwise. Intuitively, as
the government expands its debt stock so that (nm
t + n
q
t) rises, households have to sell part
of their internationally tradable assets to the central bank to purchase government liabilities.
Beyond some level φ of government borrowing, households have to start borrowing from
foreigners in order to ﬁnance their domestic debt holdings. At that point foreigners demand
ar i s kp r e m i u m .
8 The assumption of international borrowing costs that depend on the level
of foreign indebtedness has become commonplace in the open economy macroeconomics
literature. We will follow the convention in that literature, which is based on empirical
evidence, to assume a small risk premium γ. While the risk premium channel could be used
to generate interesting results of its own for portfolio decisions, in our paper it is mainly
adopted for technical reasons. Speciﬁcally, it rules out degenerate behavior of the interest
rate at extremely high levels of foreign borrowing. At more realistic levels of borrowing
we will see that the key driving force of portfolio behavior is endogenous exchange rate
volatility. It remains to specify the critical level φ. A strict interpretation of the model
requires φ =1 , based on the fact that there is no formal limit to sales of internationally
tradable assets in the model. A more ﬂexible and realistic assumption realizes that any
aggregate net international asset position reﬂects many offsetting gross positions, meaning
gross international borrowing positions will occur at φ<1. In any event, given a choice of
γ near zero the assumption about φ does not dominate the ﬁnal results.
8 Foreigners therefore do not take into account the government’s net asset position when
lending to the country’s private sector.
11Many monetary portfolio choice models introduce money into the utility function
separably because this preserves the separability between portfolio and savings decisions
found in Merton (1969, 1971). However, as pointed out by Feenstra (1986), without
ap o s i t i v ec r o s sp a r t i a lb e t w e e nm o n e ya n dconsumption the existence of money cannot
be rationalized through transactions cost savings. We therefore use a cash constraint
instead, and show that it is nevertheless possible to obtain very elegant analytical solutions.
Speciﬁcally, consumers are required to hold real money balances equal to a time-varying
multiple αt of their consumption expenditures:
ct = αtmt = αtn
m
t at . (10)
The now very common treatment of the cash-in-advance constraint in Lucas (1990) has
two aspects, a cash requirement aspect and an in-advance aspect. Our own treatment goes
back to the earlier Lucas (1982), which uses only the cash requirement aspect. This is due
to the difﬁculty of implementing the in-advance timing conventions in a continuous-time
framework. In the continuous time stochastic ﬁnance literature, Bakshi and Chen (1997)
have used the same device. Finally, note that equation (10) could also be obtained as an
optimality condition by assuming Leontief preferences over consumption and real balances,
R ∞
0 e−βtln(min(ct,α tmt))dt.
Using Itô’s lemma we can derive the real returns in terms of tradable goods on money and




























dt − σEdBt − σ
g
E,tdWt . (12)
Note that the exchange rate affects returns in two ways. First, depreciation σEdBt > 0
reduces the ex-post real value of nominal domestic assets in terms of tradables. Second, by
Jensen’s inequality, larger exchange rate volatility (σE)
2 increases their ex-ante real return.
12The household’s portfolio problem is to maximize present discounted lifetime utility by





































































t)σrdBt − σT,tdBt} .
We will solve this optimal portfolio problem recursively using a continuous time Bellman
equation, as in Merton (1969, 1971). Let V (at,t)=e−βtJ(at,t) ∈ C2 be a solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of stochastic optimal control. Let ˙ J = ∂J(at,t)/∂t.
Then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is






































































































































































This expression is not yet in a very informative form, as we ﬁrst need to solve for











The marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal utility of wealth Ja times the
effective price of consumption, where the latter varies with the opportunity cost of holding
money balances for transactions purposes. A closed form solution for J, which is required to
get an explicit expression, will be derived following the endogenization of taxes in the next
section, and following the deﬁnition of equilibrium.
2.3 Government
Monetary policy is characterized by two policy variables and by a technical condition on
the government budget.
Primary control over the level of inﬂation is achieved through a target path for the nominal
anchor consistent with an inﬂation target. In the present, ﬂexible price model this is a target
path{µt}
∞
t=0 formoneyinequation(1). Thediffusionprocess σM inthatequationisassumed
to be constant and exogenous - the government needs to allow mean zero shocks to the
money supply to accommodate exogenous ﬁnancial market shocks that may or may not be
correlated with shocks to velocity or interest rates. On the other hand, the diffusion process
σ
g
M,t is endogenous and determined in equilibrium. Finally, being an Itô process, Mt is
continuous, which ensures exchange rate determinacy.
We will show that control of the volatility of inﬂation can be achieved by setting a target
path for the stock of nominal government debt {Qt}
∞
t=0. We will also see that under our
assumptions, particularly that of a risk premium at very high levels of government debt
issuance, there is a monotonic relationship between Qt and i
q
t for all i
q
t > 0, so that there





14turns out, this target also has a secondary effect on the level of inﬂation. To show that the
government can indeed control i
q
t independently of µt requires that we ﬁnd a determinate
p o r t f o l i od e m a n ds h a r ef o r domestic currency bonds n
q
t in equation (16), after endogenizing
ﬁscal policy. The ﬁrst major objective of this paper is to clarify the conditions under which
that is possible. If it is possible, it becomes meaningful to consider separately the effects of,
ﬁrst, unsterilized foreign exchange intervention, second, domestic open market operations,
and third, sterilized foreign exchange intervention as a combination of the ﬁrst two. That
analysis will contain the main policy relevant conclusions of the paper.
Finally, we need a technical condition on the government budget. Discrete unanticipated
policy changes will generally result in discontinuous jumps of the nominal exchange rate
on impact
9, denoted E0 − E0−.H e r e0− stands for the instant before the announcement of
a new policy at time 0. At such points the government could either spend the associated
net seigniorage revenue, or it could fully redistribute it through a one-off transfer of
internationally tradable assets. We assume the latter, and this ensures that private ﬁnancial
wealth remains unchanged upon the impact of any new policy. We denote internationally
tradable assets held by the government as ht, and we denote asset transfers to compensate
exchange rate jumps by ∆h0 = −∆b0.









= −∆b0 = ∆h0 . (18)
Next we consider ﬁscal policy. The exogenous, spending component of ﬁscal policy is
speciﬁed in (4) and the endogenous, lump-sum tax component in (7). We assume that the
latter meet three requirements. First, the expected budget balance is always zero. Second,
the budgetary effects of shocks to money, velocity and international interest rates, Bt-shocks,
are exactly offset by lump-sum taxes. Third, in order for the assumption of exogeneity of
spending shocks gt in (4) to be meaningful, endogenous lump-sum taxes do not adjust to
9 Subsequent discontinuous exchange rate jumps are ruled out by arbitrage.
10 Note that ∆h0 need not equal h0 − h0−, because the policy itself may in addition involve the
purchaseorsaleofforeignexchangereservesagainstdomesticmoneyorbondsatthenewexchangerateE0.
15react to these shocks. Instead, the budget balancing role in response to such shocks falls to
the exchange rate.
The government’s budget constraint is






t + dgt . (19)
The assumption of budget balance together with (18) imply that the government’s net
wealth Wt = ht − mt − qt does not change over time:
dWt = dht − dmt − dqt =0 .
Therefore we have dht = dmt + dqt. For simplicity we also assume the initial condition
W0− =0 ,o r
h0− = m0− + q0− , (20)
which implies that
ht = mt + qt ∀t. (21)
This formulation treats government issued and central bank issued domestic currency
bonds as perfect substitutes, so that qt could represent either debt class. Condition (21)
therefore states that the consolidated government’s net domestic currency denominated
liabilities are fully backed by internationally tradable assets.
11 It should also be pointed
out that, given perfect international capital mobility, the assumption of instantaneous
redistribution in (19) is not restrictive. It is equivalent to redistribution over households’
inﬁnite lifetime combined with instantaneous capitalization by households of the expected
redistribution stream. Our treatment is analytically more convenient.
To determine the drift τt and diffusion σT,t of the tax process dTt, and the diffusion σ
g
E,t
of the exchange rate process, we equate terms in (19) using (11), (12), (3) and (21), and we





















11 Note that qt could be negative and represent government claims on the private sector. In















The ﬁrst condition ensures that the expected budget balance is always zero. The second
condition represents the endogenous response of lump-sum taxes to Bt-shocks. The third
condition is critical for our results. It represents the endogenous response of the exchange
rate to Wt-shocks. Fiscally induced exchange rate volatility depends on the volatility
of the ﬁscal shocks themselves, but it is decreasing in the amount of domestic currency
denominated liabilities the government has succeeded in issuing. This is because the base of
the ‘inﬂation tax’, the stock of nominal liabilities that can be revalued by nominal exchange
rate movements, is larger in that case. As we will see, raising the amount of domestic
currency denominated liabilities requires a higher interest rate. In other words, a higher
interest rate is (ceteris paribus) associated with lower exchange rate volatility and therefore
inﬂation volatility.
2.4 Equilibrium and Balance of Payments












t=0, initial conditions b0−,h 0−,M 0−,Q 0− and E0−, and an initial
exchange rate jump E0 − E0−, the conditions (22), (23), (24) and (18) hold at all times.
Then equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
An equilibrium is a set of initial conditions b0−,h 0−,M 0−,Q 0− and E0−, exogenous sto-
chastic processes {Bt,W t}
∞
t=0, an allocation consisting of stochastic processes
{ct,b t,h t,Q t,M t}∞
t=0, a price system consisting of an initial exchange rate jump E0 −
E0− and stochastic processes {εt,σ E,σ
g
E,t}∞
t=0, and a government policy such that,
given the initial conditions, the exogenous stochastic process, the government policy




t=0 are deterministic sequences.
17and the price system, the allocation solves households’ problem of maximizing (6) sub-
ject to (8)a n d( 10), resulting in optimality conditions (16)a n d( 17).
The condition ht = mt + qt ∀t ensures that at = bt + ht ∀t, i.e. internationally tradable
private assets at any point are equal to the economy’s net internationally tradable assets.
Then the current account can be derived by consolidating households’ and the government’s
budget constraint (8) and (19).








We are now ready to derive a closed form expression for the household value function.
The solution proceeds by ﬁrst substituting (16), (17), (22) and (23), which contain the terms
Ja and Jaa, back into the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (14). That equation is then
solved for J by way of a conjecture. Given our speciﬁcation of the utility function a good
conjecture is
J(at,t)=X [ln(at)+l n ( Y (t;xt))] , (26)





t,M t,α t,r b
t,g t
ª
. Thus, the conjecture allows for Y (.) to be a function
of both time and of the economy’s exogenous policy and shock processes. To understand
this note that the value function represents the present discounted value of expected future
consumption streams. First-order condition (17) together with (25) implies that consumption
at t is decreasing in i
q
t,i n c r e a s i n gi nαt, and proportional to at,w h e r et h el a t t e ri nt u r ni sa
function of the full set of exogenous policy and shock processes of the economy. The same
is true for expected future consumption, given the Brownian nature of shock increments.
In Appendix II we ﬁrst show that (26) implies
X = β
−1 . (27)






























Equation (29) is a standard condition in this model class. It states that consumption in
excess of the ﬂow endowment is proportional to wealth and, because of the cash constraint,
negatively related to nominal interest rates. It is equation (28), the key equation of this
paper, that distinguishes this model from other open economy models. What is says is that
the portfolio share of domestic currency denominated assets is determinate, even after taxes
have been endogenized. In the following discussion we will pass over the risk premium
term 2γI, which in our calibration is both very small and which only enters at very high
levels of government borrowing. Assume for a moment that the volatility of exogenous
ﬁscal spending is zero (σg
g =0 ). Then (28) in conjunction with (24) would imply that
i
q
t = r + εt − (σE)
2 − (σr)
2 − σEσr . (30)
Endogenizing taxes in the absence of exogenous ﬁscal spending therefore results in a version
of uncovered interest parity, the only difference being Jensen’s inequality terms relating




indeterminate. In such a model the exchange rate drift would be fully determined by money
growth, exchange rate volatility would be fully determined by exogenous Bt-shocks, and
there would be no scope for monetary policy to choose a second policy instrument such
as the interest rate i
q
t (or the stock of domestic bonds Qt). The currency composition of
central bank balance sheets would not matter. Versions of this result have been found in
other papers, such as Grinols and Turnovsky (1994) and Kumhof and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2003). The reason for this result is that full lump-sum redistribution of the net seigniorage
consequences of shocks fully insures agents against exchange rate risk in general equilibrium
- the absence of a market for hedging exchange rate risk is immaterial. Private agents may
lose from exchange rate movements at the expense of the government, but the economy as a
whole does not, and therefore neither do private agents after the government returns to them
19what it gained at their expense.
With exogenous ﬁscal spending shocks the situation is entirely different. A spending
shock dWt > 0 is a net resource loss to the economy because government spending does not
enter private utility. Furthermore, the government passes this loss on to holders of domestic
currency denominated assets through exchange rate movements. This risk of nominal
exchange rate changes, the source of which is in fact real, is the source of imperfect asset
substitutability. Equation (28) shows that the government can induce agents to expand their
portfolio share of domestic currency denominated liabilities by offering (ceteris paribus) a
higherinterestrate. Andbyequation(24)thehigherportfolioshareimpliesthat agivenﬁscal
spendingvolatilitytranslatesintoalowerinﬂationvolatilitybecausethebaseofthis‘inﬂation
tax’ is higher. Because inﬂation volatility increases the mean return of domestic currency
denominated assets by (11) and (12), interes tr a t e sh a v et or i s em o r es t r o n g l yt h em o r e
they induce substantial reductions in inﬂation volatility. The ﬁnal result is a monotonically
increasing relationship between domestic interest rates and the portfolio share of domestic
currency denominated assets. The following subsection develops the mathematics behind
this argument in more detail.
2.5 Equilibrium Exchange Rate Dynamics
Equilibrium exchange rate dynamics can be determined by noting that consumption has
to satisfy two conditions in equilibrium. The ﬁrst is the cash-in-advancec o n s t r a i n t( 1 0 ) ,a n d
the second the consumption optimality condition (29). The latter in turn links the evolution
of consumption to the evolution of assets, and therefore needs to be analyzed in conjunction
with equation (25).
We begin with (10). By Itô’s Law, the cash-in-advance constraint can be stochastically
differentiated as
dct = αtdmt + mtdαt + dmtdαt . (31)
20Again by Itô’s Law, real money balances evolve as follows:
dmt = mt
h







































E,t + σασM − σασE
i
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We rewrite the consumption optimality condition (29) as follows:
zt =( ct − y)(1+(i
q
t/αt)) − βat ≡ 0 . (34)





































while velocity evolution is given by (2). Substituting these terms into (35) and
























































To obtain the equilibrium exchange rate dynamics, we substitute (33) into (36) and
separately equate the terms multiplying dt, dBt and dWt. For simplicity denote the share




21αt and at, the following is the equilibrium system of 10 equations that determines the 10
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αtMt = Etct , (42)










We assume and later verify, for a speciﬁc calibration of the exogenous shock processes,
that this system has a unique solution for a bounded setting of the policy variables µt and
i
q
t, and given constant exogenous drift and diffusion processes of the economy’s four shock
processes.
13 This means that all endogenous variables including nt can be written uniquely
in terms of the exogenous policy and shock processes. This veriﬁes the regularity conditions
13 It can be shown that in certain borderline cases the solution may in fact not be unique, speciﬁcally when
nt > 1andγ −→ 0. Wecanruleoutsuchcasesbychoosingasufﬁcientlypositivebutstillverysmallγ.B u t
in general, it can also beshownthat uniqueness canin such cases bereestablishedif the governmentchooses
as its second policy instrument the nominal stock of bonds Q instead of the interest rate on those bonds iq.
22posited earlier for εt,σE,σ
g
E,t,τt and σT,t. I ti sa l s on e e d e dt ov e r i f yt h a to u rc o n j e c t u r e d
value function and resulting policy functions for nm
t and n
q
t solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation. The steps of that veriﬁcation are shown in Appendix II.
3 Policy Implications
3.1 An Illustrative Example
To analyze the properties of the model we now turn to data for Mexico, a small open
economy with a substantial outstanding stock of domestic currency denominated liabilities.
We use quarterly data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1996 through the second quarter of 2004 (34
observations) to estimate the drifts and variance-covariance matrix of the economy’s four
s h o c kp r o c e s s e s .W et h e ng oo nt os h o ww h a t these data imply for the behavior of inﬂation
and taxation under different assumptions about government balance sheet operations and
therefore interest rates. Indoingsowe willhold constant the calibrated parameters β =0 .04,
y =1 , φ =0 .5 and γ =0 .0001.
14
T h i si sah i g h l ys t y l i z e dm o d e le c o n o m y ,a n ds o m eo fi t sk e yf e a t u r e sh a v en oe a s i l y
identiﬁable counterpart in the data. In addition to estimating the shock processes, we
therefore need to make some reasonable assumptions and approximations. The following
exercise, while guided by the data, is therefore best seen as illustrative of our theoretical
results. Most importantly, consumption in the model is ﬁnanced from both an endowment
income and from income on ﬁnancial assets, see equation (29). We assume that the fraction
x of the latter in overall consumption spending is x =0 .02 on average. As we will see,
this has reasonable implications in the light of Mexican national accounts and government
liabilities data. Given our normalization y =1 ,t h i si m p l i e sam o d e l - c o nsistent relationship
between average consumption ¯ c and average national wealth ¯ a, which is useful because no
14 The last two assume that a borrowing premium starts to apply when households have invested
half their ﬁnancial wealth in government securities, but that the premium is extremely small.
23reliable data exists for the latter. Speciﬁcally, ¯ a =¯ cx/β.
15
The key shock process in the model is the volatility of ﬁscal spending, and all spending
shocks are assumed to be exogenous, in other words to have no endogenous tax response.
This will generally not be true in the data, see Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2004) on the
difﬁculties of distinguishing ﬁscally dominant and monetary dominant policies in the data.
W et h e r e f o r en e e dt om a k ea na s s u m p t i o na b o u tt h ef r a c t i o nz of observed ﬁscal spending
volatility that is exogenous. We assume z =0 .0225 t og e tas e to fb e n c h m a r kr e s u l t sf o r
Mexico, but we also explore the sensitivity of our results to other assumptions, given that
this is a critical parameter for our results.
We now turn to estimating the shock processes. This requires estimating a continuous-
time diffusion process from a discrete sample. Aït-Sahalia (2002) shows that this can be
quite complex in general settings, but the case of geometric Brownian motion processes is
much simpler. As shown in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, Ch. 9), such processes can
be estimated in a straightforward fashion by maximum likelihood. Note that the four shock






























dt + σαdBt = ηαdt ++ σαdBt , (46)
dr
b






















gdWt = ηgdt + σgdWt . (48)
15 Theeffectivepriceofconsumptionterm(1+(iq/α))canbeneglectedbecauseαisverylargeinthedata,
i.e. mean velocity is very high.
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We wish to estimate σg
g and the 3-by-3 variance-covariance matrix Σ of velocity,
interest rate and exogenous money shocks, which corresponds to the 3-by-3 submatrix





























dt + σGdWt = ηgdt + σGdWt . (51)
As mentioned above, we assume that a fraction z of the volatility of this process is due
to exogenous spending. We therefore have \ (σG)
2 = z ∗ \ (σML
G )
2. A comparison of (51)
and (48) shows that we need the ratio of government spending to ﬁnancial assets to obtain
an estimate b σ
g
g from c σG, and here we make use of the relationship ¯ a =¯ cx/β explained












2 in the variance-covariance matrix ˜ Σ,w eu s e b σ
g
g in (50) and replace nt by its sample
average ¯ n = ((β(M + Q))/xC),w h e r eC is nominal consumption spending. In our sample
¯ n =0 .26, in other words government liabilities represent roughly a quarter of household
ﬁnancial assets. It should be noted that if the real annual ﬁnancial returns on Mexican
government debt are multiplied by four, the resulting ﬁgure does indeed correspond to
roughly 2% of annual consumption, in line with our earlier assumption. It is in this sense
that the series of approximations that we used to get to this point is reasonable.
25It is straightforward to estimate the drifts and variance-covariance matrix of M, α and rb,
again by maximum-likelihood. After subtracting our approximation of (σ
g
M)
2 from the ﬁrst
cell of the variance-covariance matrix, we are left with nine entries can be used to separately
identify, including their signs, the nine diffusion processes σM, σα and σr.I n d o i n g s o
we impose identifying restrictions, namely that real interest rates are completely exogenous
σM
r = σα
r =0 , and that the money supply responds instantaneously to velocity shocks but
not vice versa σM
α =0 . Finally the estimated diffusions, from (45) and (46), can be used to
recover the drift processes µ and ν, while r can be estimated directly.
The results of our estimations and approximations are as follows: f =0 .5208, µ =
0.0773, ν = −0.0178, r =0 .0227, σg
g =0 .0083, σM
M =0 .0220, σα
M = −0.0009,
σr
M =0 .0025, σα
α =0 .0294, σr
α = −0.0059, σr
r = −0.0186.
These results can be used to compute a bas e l i n ee c o n o m y .T od os ow ea l s on e e dt oﬁx
velocity at its sample average ¯ α =3 4 .4 and the initial nominal exchange rate at its sample
average ¯ E =9 .35. This can then be used to compute the key initial quantities ¯ a, ¯ M and ¯ Q.
3.2 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy consists of an inﬂation target and balance sheet operations.
16 It is
straightforward that the main tool for achieving an inﬂation target in the current ﬂexible price
model is a target path {µt}
∞
t=0 for money. We will simply hold µ constant at its estimated
valueforMexico. Themainsubjectofthispaperisbalancesheet operations, ofwhichwecan
distinguish three types. An unsterilized foreign exchange intervention is a sale or purchase of
foreign exchange reserves h in exchange for domestic money M. An open market operation
isasaleorpurchaseofdomesticcurrencybonds QinexchangefordomesticmoneyM.S u c h
operations can be used to ’sterilize’ the effect of an unsterilized intervention on the money
stock. A fully sterilized foreign exchange intervention is therefore a sale or purchase of
16 For simplicity, and because the relationship Pt = Et holds, we will conduct our discussion
in terms of inﬂation and the price level instead of exchange rate depreciation and the nominal exchange rate.
26domestic currency bonds Q in exchange for foreign currency bonds h, holding M constant.
We analyze the effect of balance sheet operations on equilibrium quantities using the
system of equations (37) - (44), holding constant αt =¯ α Because full government
compensation for initial exchange rate jumps (18) is assumed, at is always constant on
impact at =¯ a. The nine panels in Figure 2 show, going from the left to the middle
of each panel, the effect of a doubling of the nominal money supply through a foreign
exchange purchase. Going from the middle to the right, they show how the economy reacts
if this expansion of the money supply is reversed through a domestic open market operation
(OMO), speciﬁcally a sale of domestic currency bonds against money.
The foreign exchange intervention could be occasioned, for example, by the central bank
accommodating, on a one-off basis, a large capital inﬂow. But the effect would of course
be highly inﬂationary, causing a doubling of the price level. This in turn would negatively
affect the real value of domestic bonds and therefore the overall share of domestic assets in
agents’ portfolios. The government’s domestic liabilities however provide a cushion against
ﬁscal shocks, and this operation therefore not only doubles the price level, it also doubles the
subsequent volatility of inﬂation. Because inﬂation volatility increases the ex-ante return of
holders of domestic assets, the equilibrium int e r e s tr a t ec a nt h e nf a l lb ya r o u n d0 . 5 % .T h e
cost tothe government of higher inﬂation volatility turns out to outweigh the interest savings,
so that the government has to raise net taxes. Note that consumption is barely affected by the
change in interest rates, principally because, for the Mexican data set we used to calibrate
the baseline economy, velocity is extremely high. This may not be true for other countries,
and a signiﬁcantly lower interest rate could then clearly stimulate consumption.
The open market operation completely sterilizes the foreign exchange intervention, so
that the exchange rate is driven back to its initial value. But importantly, other variables
do not return to their baseline values. Most importantly, while real money balances
are unchanged after sterilization, the real quantity of outstanding domestic liabilities has
increased signiﬁcantly, thereby lowering inﬂation volatility, increasing interest rates, and
27lowering the required tax rate to balance the government budget. Sterilized intervention
therefore has signiﬁcant real effects, and as stated above with a lower velocity those effects
would also include lower consumption.
The following Figures 3-5 illustrate the effects of sterilized intervention over a broader
range of sterilized interventions. Figure 3 shows the Mexican baseline case. This time we
show the domestic asset share nt in % along the horizontal axis. The ﬁrst panel shows
the relationship between the stock of domestic currency government securities Qt and nt.
Issuing more nominal debt increases the real debt stock given that full sterilization keeps the
nominal money stock constant. As the domestic debt share rises from 10% to 60%, ﬁscally
induced inﬂation volatility σ
g
E,t falls from 1% in annual interest rate equivalent terms to near
zero, because more debt absorbs ﬁscal shocks through smaller price level movements. This
lowers overall inﬂation volatility by the same amount, because inﬂation volatility originating
from the three non-ﬁscal shocks is constant.
17 As investors beneﬁtf r o mi n ﬂation volatility,
the equilibrium nominal interest rate has to rise. That rise is however very nonlinear, because
most of the effects of lower inﬂation volatility happen at lower levels of debt. From around
a 30% debt share onwards, further expansions of the nominal debt stock have quite modest
effects on inﬂation volatility and interest rates. Note that a higher interest rate also has
a secondary effect on mean inﬂation, but this is very minor compared to the effect of the
nominal anchor µt. Finally, as we saw above, a higher debt stock allows the government to
lower the mean tax rate, because the negative effect of higher interest rates on the budget is
more than offset by the beneﬁcial effect of less volatile inﬂation.
Combining the above results, it is also clear that the effect of a given contraction of the
money supply depends on the market through which that contraction is implemented. The
effects on interest rates are larger if done through the domestic bond rather than the foreign
exchange market, because under open market operations the portfolio share nt expands not
just due to a drop in the price level but also due to an expansion of the domestic nominal
17 It is also signiﬁcantly smaller at low levels of debt issuance.
28bond stock. This requires an even lower interest rate to establish portfolio balance.
Figures 4 and 5 show how these results on the effects of sterilized intervention depend
on the volatility of exogenous ﬁscal shocks, leaving all other parameters of the model
unchanged. Figure4 showsthat, when theﬁscal shockdiffusion σg
g is reducedfrom0.0083to
0.002, balance sheet operations over the same range of Q as those reported in Figure 3 have
almost no effect on inﬂation volatility and interest rates, while we see in Figure 5 that raising
σg
g to 0.024 increases the range over which they are effective, and it increases the size of their
effect on interest rates. This may explain why empirical studies of sterilized intervention
have found very little evidence for their effect in industrialized countries. In such countries
the ﬁscal situation is generally much more robust, and ﬁscal dominance is much less of
a problem. At the same time, even if there was ﬁscal dominance, the ability of such
countries to issue substantial amounts of domestic currency denominated debt means that
the induced inﬂation volatility would be comparatively low. On the other hand, developing
countries routinely engage in sterilized intervention, especially when faced with volatile
capital inﬂows, and they have much more difﬁculty issuing substantial stocks of domestic
currency debt. In such countries sterilized intervention would be a second tool of monetary
policy that gives the central bank autonomy to set nominal interest rates independently of
the inﬂation target. The bottom line is that low outstanding stocks of domestic currency
debt combined with high ﬁscal volatility give rise to imperfect asset substitutability between
domestic and foreign currency debt, and that this is most likely to be observed in developing
countries.
294C O N C L U S I O N
We have studied a general equilibrium monetary portfolio choice model of a small
open economy with ﬂoating exchange rates and ﬂexible prices. The model emphasizes the
importance of ﬁscal policies for the number of instruments available to monetary policy,
speciﬁcally for its ability to affect allocations and prices through balance sheet operations
such as sterilized intervention. Conventional results were shown to depend on a particular
assumption about ﬁscal policy, fulllump-sumredistributionofstochasticseigniorageincome
and an absence of exogenous ﬁscal spending shocks. When this assumption is relaxed, two
important results are obtained.
First, government balance sheet operations matters even if they do not affect the money
stock. Their primary effect is on the volatility of inﬂation, because a larger outstanding stock
of nominal government debt requires smaller price level movements to balance the budget
following an exogenous ﬁscal spending shock. The volatility of inﬂa t i o ni nt u r na f f e c t st h e
domestic nominal interest rate. Putting this differently, the central bank can set its domestic
interest rate and its inﬂation target independently to affect both the mean and the variance of
inﬂation.
Second, uncovered interest parity fails to hold. Large risk discounts are obtained when
a central bank’s nominal liabilities are small and the volatility of its ﬁscal shocks is high,
because ﬁscal shocks induce a high nominal exchange rate volatility that increases investors’
ex-ante return. On the other hand, risk premia become possible when a central bank issues
very large amounts of nominal liabilities, because of risk premia charged by international
lenders. Our paper has not focused on the latter aspect, but it has provided the analytical
apparatus for doing so.
A welfare analysis of different policy choices is currently beyond the scope of the paper,
but the outlines of the trade-off are clear. Up to some point the government can expand its
stock of nominal liabilities and achieve three objectives that, in more detailed models, are all
30welfare improving. These are a reductionof mean inﬂation, a reductionof inﬂationvolatility,
and a reduction of taxes needed to balance the budget. It can be shown that required taxation
begins to increase once households have to start borrowing and paying a risk premium in
order to ﬁnance further holdings of domestic currency denominated liabilities. The point
at which this may occur for a speciﬁc country could be earlier than assumed in the present
model, but there will nevertheless be a broad range over which a government should be able
to increase its issue of nominal liabilities with very positive effects.
31Appendix I Returns on Assets













































dt − σEdBt − σ
g
E,tdWt . (A.1)
The real return on the domestic bond is given by its nominal interest rate i
q
t, minus the












dt − σEdBt − σ
g
E,tdWt . (A.2)
The real return on internationally tradable assets is exogenous and given by (3), which is
repeated here for completeness.
dr
b




t − 1) . (A.3)
Appendix II The Value Function
This Appendix veriﬁes the conjectured value function V (at,t)=e−βtJ(at,t)=
e−βtX[ln(at)+l n ( Y (t;xt))] and derives closed form expressions for X and Y (t;xt).
Substitute the conjecture, the optimality condition (17), and the government policy rules
(22), (23) and (24) into the Bellman equation (14). Then cancel terms to get
βXln(at)+βXln(Y (t;xt)) − X
˙ Y (t;xt)
Y (t;xt)





























32where ˙ Y (t;xt)=∂Y(t;xt)/∂t. Equating terms on ln(at) yields
X = β
−1 . (B.1)
This implies the ﬁrst-order conditions (28) and (29) shown in the paper. We are left with
a differential equation in Y (t;xt) as follows:
˙ Y (t;xt)
Y (t;xt)




























The equilibrium set of equations determining the evolution of the economy are presented




t). This means that all terms on the right-hand side of (B.2) are, or
canbeexpresseduniquelyintermsof, exogenouspolicyorshockvariablesxt, asconjectured
at the outset. Furthermore,
∂ ˙ Y (t;xt)
Y (t;xt)
| ˙ Y (t;xt)=0 = β>0 . (B.3)
This implies that Y (t;xt) is saddle path stable for any given xt, and is therefore uniquely
determined for each t and xt. It is instructive to consider the value of Y (t;xt) under some
simplifying assumptions. Let αt =¯ α ∀t,l e tiq be set such that r(1 + (iq/¯ α)) = β and
such that I =0 .T h e nw eh a v e(E(dat))/dt =0and ct = rat. We obtain a steady state












. In the absence of the ﬁnal term, we would have
J(at,t;xt)= 1
β ln(ct). However, the actual utility value of at is lower because of risk to the
return on internationally tradable assets and risk to asset accumulation due to government
spending volatility.
Our approach has followed Dufﬁe’s (1996, Ch. 9) discussion of optimal portfolio and
consumption choice in that we have focused mainly on necessary conditions. This is because
theexistenceof well-behavedsolutionsinacontinuous-timesettingistypicallyhard toprove
in general terms. We have adopted the alternative approach of conjecturing a solution and
33thenverifyingit, andhave foundthat ourconjectureV (at,t)does solve theHamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation and is therefore a logical candidate for the value function. In the process
of doing so we have also solved for the associated feedback controls (n
q∗
t ,n m∗
t ) and wealth
process a∗
t.W en o wv e r i f yt h a tV (at,t) and (n
q∗
t ,n m∗
t ) are indeed optimal.
























¤2 − βJ(at,t)+ ˙ J(at,t) .
(B.5)
The functions g(.,.,.) and h(.,.,.) derive from the equilibrium evolution of wealth at given


















































t ) be an arbitrary admissible control for initial wealth a0 and let at be the
associated wealth process. By Itô’s formula, the stochastic integral for the evolution of the
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The transversality condition (15) can easily be veriﬁed because both wealth at and the
term Y (t;xt) at most grow at an exponential rate. The left-hand side of (B.6’) is therefore
zero. Because the chosen control is arbitrary, (B.4) implies that
−DJ(at,t) = ln(αtn
m








s as − y)ds . (B.7)













s − y)ds . (B.8)
We therefore conclude that J(a0,0) dominates the value obtained from any other
admissible control process, and that the controls (n
q∗
t ,n m∗
t ) are indeed optimal.
Appendix III Data
Quarterly data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1996 through the second quarter of 2004 are
used. We use an interpolated series of annual population ﬁgures obtained from International
Financial Statistics (IFS) to convert aggregate to per capita series, and we use Peso-dollar
exchange rate data obtained from Banco de Me x i c ot oc o n v e r tn o m i n a lt or e a ls e r i e s .
Because the velocity series is a ratio of a stock to a ﬂow, we used as our stock data series
the midpoint of each quarter instead of the endpoint. For consistency we did so all series,
including base money. The series for nominal base money is from Banco de Mexico, and is
converted to per capita terms. The velocity series is the ratio of nominal domestic absorption
35(from IFS) to the stock of base money, where quarterly absorption is multiplied by four
to obtain an annual series. Real interest rates are gross annualized US treasury bill rates
divided by gross annualized one-quarter ahead US CPI inﬂation (from IFS).
18 Government
spending is computed as the sum of government consumption and government investment
from national accounts data available at Banco de Mexico, and put on a real per capita
basis by divided by the exchange rate and population. Finally, we need to compute the
sample average portfolio share of Mexican government liabilities. To do so we obtain data
for nominal outstanding stocks of base money M and government debt Q from Banco de
Mexico. Nearly all Mexican government debt is denominated in local currency.
18 We have also worked with the log difference of the CPI-deﬂated S&P500 index. The main
results of the paper do not change in that case.
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Figure 1: Foreign Holdings of Mexican Government Securities - % of Total (Source: Banco
de Mexico)
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Figure 2: Unsterilized Foreign Exchange Purchase and Open Market Sale
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Figure 3: Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention - Baseline Case
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Figure 4: Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention - Low Volatility of Fiscal Shocks
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Figure 5: Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention - High Volatility of Fiscal Shocks
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